Benjamin Acosta, "From Bombs to Ballots: When Militant Organizations Transition to Political Parties," *The Journal of Politics* (2014)

Material for Online Appendix

Table A: Data Overview

Variable	Explanation of Coding	Source/s
Transition to Political Party	See the main article for an explanation of the coding. Note: organizations are not coded as "transitioning" if they were originally a political party that became a militant organization and then reverted back to party politics. Note: Among the 46 organizations coded as transitioning, three did not participate in elections. In one case, an organization has yet to participate in elections but has agreed to participate in upcoming elections. In the two other cases, organizations agreed to participate in elections but went defunct prior to the respective elections. In all three cases, the organizations began to express and promote their ideological platforms legally within the framework of an electoral system. Models 5 and 6 remove these organizations from the analysis, as well as cases in which an organization has only participated in one national election.	I cross-referenced data entries with two or more sources, including: the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), "Terrorist Groups," accessible at *www.nctc.gov/site/groups/index.html*; NCTC, "Terrorist Profiles," accessible at *www.nctc.gov/site/profiles/index.html*; the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups, "Violent Extremism Knowledge Base," accessible at *www.isvg.org*; Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START); accessible at *www.start.umd.edu/gtd*; Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, "Terrorist Organization Profiles," accessible at *www.start.umd.edu/start/data%5Fcollections/tops/*; and Acosta (2014). Tertiary references include: Radu & Tismaneanu (1990); Kushner (2003); Byman (2005); Karmon (2005); Hoffman (2006); Jones & Libicki (2008); and Salehyan, Gleditsch & Cunningham (2011).
Organization Age/Duration	I code the onset of duration as either the date of an official declaration of a militant organization's establishment or the date of its first confirmed act of political violence. The end of duration for defunct organizations is coded as the date of elimination by force or an officially declared date of dissolution.	
Organization Outcome Goals	See the main article for an explanation of the coding. Also, Cronin (2009) and Abrahms (2012) offer in-depth discussions on the differences between "process" and "outcome" goals.	
Organization Goal Type	I code the outcome goal type for each organization as one of six binary variables: Overthrow/Replace Target, Separate/Secede from Target, Establish an Empire, Institute Social/Economic Reforms, Succeed in Counter-Revolution, and Precipitate System Collapse. See the main article for an explanation of each type.	
Organization Ideology	I code three binary ideology variables: Islamist, Leftist, and Nationalist. See the main article for an explanation of each type.	
Organization Achievement Level	See the main article for an explanation of the coding and Table B for coding examples.	
Initially Formed by Political Party	This binary variable identifies whether a political party established a particular militant organization. For example, the Turkish political party Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi founded the militant organization Bozkurtlar.	
Organization Size	I code two binary variables of whether an organization reaches 1,000-plus members and 10,000-plus members.	After coding observations utilizing sources from above, I cross-referenced my findings with Jones & Libicki's (2008) dataset.
State Supporters	See the main article for an explanation of the coding.	The data on state sponsors and ties builds from and expands Acosta's (2014) dataset.
Ties to Other Militant Organizations	I define a *tie* as a declared formal alliance, affiliation, or partnership between two organizations. Co-sponsored attacks also demonstrate an inter-organizational connection, as do other forms of documented collaboration like sharing a training camp. Ties are likewise identified through "conduits," or the identification of individual operatives that link together two or more militant organizations.	

Table A: Data Overview (Continued)

Variable	Explanation of Coding	Source/s
Number of Attacks	I count each attack an organization conducts as a separate attack, even when carried out simultaneously with other attacks. For example, I count al-Qaeda's September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States as four attacks rather than a single attack.	The data on the number of attacks that each organization conducted derives from the GTD. I cross-referenced the GTD with RAND Corporation's Database of World Terrorism Incidents (DWTI); accessible at *www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents. html.* For organizations not documented in GTD, I used DWTI data. The data on suicide attacks is from my original dataset; accessible at *www.sandatabase.org.* It was cross-referenced with the data from GTD. Specific attacks found in my dataset that were not present in GTD were tallied and added to the total attack counts of given organizations.
Polity IV	I converted Polity IV's -10 to 10 scale to a fully positive scale by adding 10.	Polity IV; accessible at *www.systemicpeace.org/ polity/polity4.htm.*
GDP Per Capita	I measure per capita gross domestic product in thousands of U.S. dollars.	The World Bank; accessible at *data.worldbank. org.*
Representative Permissiveness	The data on the representative permissiveness of electoral systems is coded as one of three binary variables: Proportional Representation, Majoritarian, and Mixed System. A Non-Democracy binary variable (signifying whether a target has a Polity score below 6) is coded as the baseline.	The data on representative permissiveness derives from the "Democratic Electoral Systems around the World 1946-2011" dataset (Bormann & Golder 2013). For cases involving timeframes outside of the dataset, I conducted additional research.
Autocratic Institutions	The data on autocratic participatory institutions is coded as one of three binary variables: Legislature, Legislature and Opposition Parties, and Single State Party. A Democracy binary variable (signifying whether a target has a Polity score of 6 or above) is coded as the baseline.	The data on autocratic institutions and the institutionalization of multi-party systems derives from the "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited" dataset (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland 2010). For cases involving timeframes outside of the dataset, I conducted additional research.
Shift from Single to Multi-Party System	This binary variable indicates whether a target state has shifted from a single to multi-party system, including cases of either democratization or movement to a semi-participatory regime.	
Banned Parties	This binary variable marks whether a target state bans specific parties.	The data on bans derives from the "Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP)" dataset (Regan, Frank & Clark 2009). For cases involving timeframes outside of the dataset, I conducted additional research.
Ban Lifted	This binary variable identifies whether a target state lifted the ban of a particular party during a militant organization's life span.	

Table B: Examples of Achievement Coding

Organization	Outcome Goal	Progress	Successful?	Transitioned?
Fatah	Est. Palestinian State	controls the West Bank politically	partially	yes
Hamas	Est. Religious State	controls Gaza politically	partially	yes
Palestinian Islamic Jihad	Est. Religious State	operates in the West Bank and Gaza	no	no
Ushria Çlirimatare Kosovës	Est. Kosovar State	broke off Kosovo from Serbia	completely	no
Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq/Khazali Network	Expel Foreigners	helped expel U.S. forces from Shi'a areas of Iraq	completely	no
Ulster Volunteer Force	Counter-Revolution	stymied Irish-republican efforts to secede from the UK	completely	no
Secret Anti-Communist Army (ESA)/ARENA	Counter-Revolution	stymied Communist El Salvadoran efforts	completely	yes
al-Qaeda	Est. Religious Empire	operates in multiple states	no	no
Ku Klux Klan	Social Revolution	maintains marginal support in parts of the U.S.	no	no
Sendero Luminoso	Replace Regime	eliminated by Peru	no	no
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha	Est. Terai State	continues to fight rival and the Nepalese government	no	no
Informal Anarchist Federation	System Collapse	continues to conduct operations in Italy and elsewhere	no	no
Adivasi Cobra Militant Force of Assam	Gain Adivasi Autonomy	now pursues autonomy through non-violent means	no	yes
Madhesi People's Rights Forum	Gain Madhesi Autonomy	now pursues autonomy through non-violent means	no	yes
Bandera Roja	Replace Regime	participated in electoral politics prior to going defunct	no	yes
Hezbollah	Est. Religious State	controls parts of Beirut and South Lebanon	partially	yes
al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya/Hezb al-Benaa wal-Tanmia	Est. Religious State	helped overthrow regime and recast Egyptian state	partially	yes
RENAMO	Implement Populism	contends for power in Mozambique	partially	yes
Tigray People's Liberation Front	Replace Regime	contends for power in Ethiopia	partially	yes
Zintan Militia	Replace Regime	controls parts of Libya	partially	no

Table C: Militant Transitions

	Did Not Transition	Transitioned to Party	Total
Operative	182	30	212
Defunct	178	16	194
Total	360	46	406

Additional Models

The Loss of State Sponsorship

A possible alternative explanation of militant transition revolves around a loss of state
sponsorship. Over time, the interests of state supporters change, and sometimes states withdraw
their support for militant organizations, or in other cases sponsoring regimes fall. Boot contends:
"When [militant organizations] do have substantial aid and it is cut off, the result can be catastrophic,
as it was for…Angola's UNITA, which was cut off by South Africa and the United States in the
1990s (2013, 566)." Similarly, Manning (2008) argues that Mozambique's RENAMO only entered
into negotiations as a consequence of military stalemate and a loss of external support. Connable

and Libicki (2010) suggest that withdrawal of state support leaves militants in weakened positions that often lead to their defeat. After losing a state sponsor, militant organizations with some foresight might abandon violence and look to party politics to continue pursuing their outcome goals. Both UNITA and RENAMO transitioned to party politics, and perhaps they did as a result of losing sponsorship. To test this possibility, I add the explanatory variable LOSS OF STATE SPONSORSHIP to the logit analysis. In Table D, Model A demonstrates that the loss of state sponsorship has no direct effect on the likelihood of militant transition. Importantly, organizations like UNITA and RENAMO each maintained multiple state supporters after losing individual sponsors, reiterating that organizations with more state supporters are more likely to transition.

State Sponsor Type

The political and economic development of state supporters might affect their willingness or ability to help sponsored organizations transition to political parties. To test whether sponsor development levels predict militant transition, I add the variables SPONSOR POLITY and SPONSOR GDP PER CAPITA to the logit analysis. Models B shows that economic development of primary state sponsors has a slight significant effect, but in Model C the effects are no longer significant once controlling for organizational outcome goal type. The lack of an effect from sponsor attributes mirrors Walter's finding that "stronger third party guarantees [are] no more effective than weak ones" in resolving civil wars (2002, 97). Walter adds: "In the vast majority of cases, a third-party guarantee, no matter how strong or weak, led to [successful resolution of the conflict] (2002, 97)."

Instituting a Multi-Party System

A militant organization could find an adversary's shift from a one-party to multi-party political system attractive, possibly precipitating the organization's transition to party politics. To test such a possibility, I assess the variable SHIFT TO MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM, which marks the institution of a multi-party system (including full-fledged processes of democratization). Model D reveals that newly instituted multi-party systems do not predict militant transition.

Party Bans and Lifting Bans

When target states impose or lift bans on specific parties and organizations from

participating in electoral politics, the laws may affect militant transition negatively in the case of the

former and positively in the case of the latter. To test their effects, I add the variable of BANNED

PARTIES, which marks whether a target state bans particular parties and the variable of BAN LIFTED,

which signifies the removal of such a ban during a militant organization's life span. Models E and F

demonstrate that neither variable is associated with militant transition.

Table D: Militant Transition to Party Politics (Logistic Regression Results)

y= Transition to Political Party	Model A: Lost Sponsor	Model B: Sponsor Type	Model C: Sponsor Type	Model D: Multi-Party	Model E: Banned Parties	Model F: Ban Lifted
	coef/(rse)	coef/(rse)	coef/(rse)	coef/(rse)	coef/(rse)	coef/(rse)
Age	0.004	0.007	0.009	0.005	0.002	-0.0003
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.014)
1000-Plus Members	0.605	0.621	0.626	0.631	0.624	0.551
	(0.543)	(0.549)	(0.543)	(0.531)	(0.546)	(0.538)
10,000-Plus Members	-0.302	-0.429	-0.650	-0.305	-0.345	-0.305
	(0.603)	(0.616)	(0.633)	(0.594)	(0.621)	(0.612)
Initially Formed by Political Party	0.599	0.634	0.150	0.529	0.618	0.573
	(0.598)	(0.555)	(0.553)	(0.594)	(0.579)	(0.565)
Number of Attacks	0.0001	0.0001	0.00003	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Number of State Sponsors	0.677***	0.631***	0.613***	0.647***	0.609***	0.644***
	(0.233)	(0.187)	(0.174)	(0.183)	(0.180)	(0.179)
Primary Sponsor Polity		-0.030	-0.012			
		(0.033)	(0.035)			
Primary Sponsor GDP Per Capita		0.0001*	0.00004			
		(0.00003)	(0.00002)			
Loss of State Sponsorship	-0.171					
	(0.688)					
Ties to Other Militant Organizations	-0.001	0.002	-0.004	-0.005	0.002	0.005
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Primary Enemy Polity	0.042	0.049	0.034	0.040	0.036	0.036
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Shift from Single to Multi-Party System				-0.339		
				(0.685)		
Banned Parties					0.379	
					(0.477)	
Ban Lifted						0.516
						(0.582)
Primary Enemy GDP Per Capita	-0.000002	-0.000003	-0.000003	-0.000001	0.0000003	0.000001
	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)
Complete Outcome Goal Achievement	-0.316	-0.400	-0.447	-0.365	-0.257	-0.349
	(0.643)	(0.642)	(0.663)	(0.626)	(0.652)	(0.635)
Partial Outcome Goal Achievement	2.661***	2.685***	2.819***	2.695***	2.584***	2.618***
	(0.524)	(0.545)	(0.554)	(0.538)	(0.557)	(0.540)
Overthrow/Replace Target			1.213***			
			(0.464)			
Constant	-4.521***	-4.666***	-5.042***	-4.499***	-4.590***	-4.445***
	(0.545)	(0.594)	(0.673)	(0.538)	(0.542)	(0.524)
Number of observations	406	406	406	406	406	406
Pseudo R²	0.37	0.38	0.41	0.37	0.37	0.37
Wald chi²	(12) 93.14***	(13) 90.59***	(14) 73.44***	(12) 93.89***	(12) 96.09***	(12) 94.38***
Log pseudolikelihood	-90.145	-88.937	-85.078	-90.062	-89.821	-89.769
Correctly Classified	91.63%	92.36%	93.10%	91.63%	91.87%	91.13%
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1						

Appendix References

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